Daniel Porras, Secure World Foundation; Laetitia Zarkan Cesari, University of Luxembourg
Keywords: Space security, STM, SSA, UN, arms control, RPO
Abstract:
Safety Norms for Space Security: How the Development of STM Norms Can Strengthen Security in Space
By
Daniel Porras and
Laetitia Zarkan
“Space traffic management” (STM) encompasses several concepts, including space-traffic-coordination (where things should go), space-object monitoring (where things are) and implementing regulatory regimes (keeping things where they should be). At the multi-lateral level, STM and its relevant components are typically discussed in the context of civilian and commercial activities with the intention of mitigating safety concerns. What is often left out of these conversations, however, are covert activities carried out by military actors. These activities, such as military rendezvous proximity operations (RPOs), are typically classified by the space community as “security” issues and are rarely addressed by civilian stakeholders. The topic of military RPOs is seldom addressed even by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses for Outer Space. Ironically, the multilateral bodies that do deal with space-security issues rarely discuss STM.
One of the particular challenges that arises among the international community from not having a security discussion on STM is that it is difficult to call out an offending party for doing something aggressive or hostile when there is no objective standard by which to measure orbital activities. There is not even any global consensus on what constitutes a hostile activity by a space object. Recent examples of controversial activities include maneuvers by the Russian Luch/Olymp satellite, which approached a number of European and American satellites. When affected States sought to shame Russia for these activities, there was no objective standard of behaviour by which to measure, making the accusations appear to be politically driven. Consequently, the offending activities remain unaddressed as several other actors, including the US and China, are also engaging in such provocative RPOs. The worst-case scenario is that these RPOs will result in miscalculation or misinterpretation by strategic rivals, leading to a possible nuclear escalation.
A second challenge that arises in security discussions around STM is that of “verification”. Even if there were norms of behaviour, could the international community even detect and attribute breaches of those norms? Ten years ago, the answer among the international community was an emphatic “no”, and many security discussions around STM did not even begin. However, the field of space situational awareness has changed considerably. Today, there are more telescopes, better telescopes and more sophisticated data-processing capabilities, making it at least technically feasible to verify some activities in orbit. Indeed, with commercial space-observation businesses and civilian organisations cropping up all around the world, it is becoming increasingly difficult for any activities to go unnoticed, even if they do go unreported.
In this context, the development of two STM-related norms could lead to both safety and security benefits.
· The first is the establishment of safety zones for RPOs. If a party comes within a particular distance of another space object without prior permission, the approach can be classified as hostile. Such zones could be set at a distance where it is no longer practicable to distinguish between two space objects with industry-grade technology. While this may not stop all nefarious activities (such as eavesdropping), it could at least prevent the threat of physical harm to a space object. This approach is not unlike that in maritime activities, where a fishing vessel would not approach a naval destroyer for fear of giving the wrong impression.
· The second is the increased sharing of space-situational awareness data among government agencies, companies and organisations. By increasing the amount of data being shared, it will be easier to monitor and enforce STM norms and regulations, as well as to deter norm violations. It also allows for cross-checking data, ensuring that actions are not being misattributed. Moreover, it will make it less practicable for actors to conduct unsolicited RPOs that might be labeled as hostile.
While the major security concerns surrounding RPOs should be dealt with by international bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament, it is unlikely that there will be any breakthroughs in security related discussions at this time. Politics has thus far prevented the advancement of any international agreements on space security, and all signs indicate that the relationships among geopolitical rivals are only getting worse. However, other fora could be sought as STM is largely a safety issue, rather than a security one. Discussions could take place at COPUOS on STM, with UN delegations receiving the same support from Capitals as would their security counterparts.
By focusing on these two norms, the international community could bring greater security and safety for all space operations. Critically, it will create a guard-rail against possible strategic escalation by setting a norm for RPOs that all space actors can recognize. Under these circumstances, States could be much more effective in calling out hostile behaviour by bad actors in space.
Date of Conference: September 14-17, 2021
Track: SSA/SDA